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Abstract 
The article analyses Mark of the Devil (1970) 
and examines the role of empathetic imagination 
and voyeuristic pleasure in the process of film 
reception, as proposed by cognitive approaches 
to film studies. It focuses on key features of the 
narrative (unpunished crimes and unjust 
suffering) and emphasises accordingly the 
fundamental ambivalence of spectatorship 
(sympathising vs. sadistic looking), while 
discussing the modes of viewing connected to 
different concepts of voyeurism and related 
questions about moral dilemmas. The article 
underlines the notion that, by showing scenes of 
torture in such a naturalistic manner, this mode 
of storytelling encourages voyeurism, while the 
excessive injustices contained in the plot are just 
as strong a driving force, motivating moral 
reflexions on the action. The article also 
scrutinises the film’s self-reflexive nature via an 
analysis of a key scene, and presents related 
moralist and metafictional interpretations of the 
film. 
 
Keywords: exploitation, cognitive film studies, 
moral, voyeurism, spectacle, spectatorship, 
Mark of the Devil. 
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In this article we examine the film Mark of the 
Devil (Hexen bis aufs Blut gequält, Michael 
Armstrong, 1970) as a creative and self-reflexive 
artwork that uses strikingly sensational visuals 
and sound, a characteristic feature of the 
exploitation genre, to disconcerting effect. We 
begin with an analysis of the relationship 
between the story and audiovisual representation 
on the general basis of cognitive theories, as 
exemplified by David Bordwell’s approach, 
which argues for the explanation of the 
perceptual and cognitive aspects of film 
viewing: “In general, cognitive theory wants to 
understand such human mental activities as 
recognition, comprehension, inference-making, 
interpretation, judgment, memory, and 
imagination.”1 Since we base our hypotheses 
closely on a cognitive perspective, we place 
special emphasis on the aspect of spectatorship. 
According to Carl Plantinga “[o]ne of the 
fundamental activities of the viewer of a 
narrative film is ‘mind reading’, and then 
responding. In other words, spectators come to 
understand the intentions, motivations, desires, 
and behaviour of fictional characters in the 
context of narrative situations.”2 As our starting 
point we will consider the characteristics of the 
narrative – i.e. the cognitive representation of 
the plot constructed by the viewer – followed by 
a discussion of the perception of audiovisual 
spectacle and horrific images and sound. From a 
perspective that is interested in spectatorship, it 
is necessary to investigate human reactions to a 
film – perception, imagination, sensation – and 
their specific dynamics.3 The viewer is 
considered here as an abstract spectator, 
independent of gender, age or cultural 
background, who relies on basic mechanisms of 
the human psyche. Our concept of the spectator 
does not consider any actual cultural and 
subjective experience to which a real spectator 
could resort.  
 
The Difficulties of Empathic Engagement 
Exploitation film is usually associated with 
patchy narration. Entries in the genre often have 
loose narratives that, on the first viewing, seem 
too muddled to be completely coherent. 
Exploitation movies are often distinguished from 
other films by privileging spectacle over an 
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elaborately and comprehensively narrated plot. 
Instead of conveying a narrative coherently and 
economically, such films tend to supply a wealth 
of excessive and seemingly gratuitous 
audiovisual elements, like car chases, sex scenes 
or violent murders, that sometimes seem 
unnecessary for the comprehension of the story. 
These movies often do not provide all the 
narrative clues needed to produce a coherent 
plot; therefore, spectators are forced to infer and 
speculate to make a chain of events plausible 
and meaningful.4 
 
If every fictional film can be understood as a 
special batch of various stimuli to create 
imaginary narratives with a particular 
perspective on selected segments and events of 
the fictional world, these narrative styles, 
conventions and templates vary greatly between 
different film genres. Such schemes support 
diverse narratives, fictions and points of view, 
thus supplying a broad spectrum of pleasures 
that arise from immersing oneself in stories, 
experiencing fictional worlds, closely 
monitoring the actions of characters and 
imagining diverse points of view of different 
characters.5 With these functions in mind, we 
now turn to analysing the cognitive and 
emotional mechanisms at work in Mark of the 
Devil. 
 
The film is set in a rural Austrian village in the 
eighteenth century that is terrorised by the local 
witchfinder Albino (Reggie Nalder) who 
randomly tortures innocents without trial. Lord 
Cumberland (Herbert Lom) and his young 
apprentice Christian (Udo Kier) arrive in town to 
replace Albino. Christian, who falls in love with 
waitress Vanessa (Olivera Vučo), believes in the 
impeccability of his superior, but loses his faith 
when he realises that even the esteemed 
Cumberland murders arbitrarily and for profit. 
The executioner Jeff Wilkens (Herbert Fux) and 
the advocate (Johannes Buzalski), Cumberland 
and Albino’s henchmen, break into a private 
house where nobleman Walter (Adrian Hoven) 
and his wife (Ingeborg Schöner) stage a puppet 
play that satirises the witch craze. The witch 
hunters attack the players and in the course of 
the brawl, Walter’s wife blinds the advocate. 
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The puppeteers are thrown into the dungeon, 
where the man is tortured and the woman is 
raped by Cumberland. The latter also strangles 
Albino, who has derided the lord because of his 
impotence. With Christian’s help, Vanessa, who 
too is accused of witchcraft and imprisoned, 
manages to escape from the dungeon and calls 
on the peasants to storm the castle, which serves 
as Cumberland’s official residence. Whereas the 
leading witchfinder evades the people’s rage, the 
innocent Christian is lynched by an angry mob. 
 
Recently, cognitive film theories have 
emphasised the role of empathetic imagining for 
the construction of narratives in the mind of the 
spectator.6 According to these studies, empathy 
is understood as a process of imagination; in 
particular, it is a type of personal imagination, in 
which one mentally simulates experiences or 
certain events and imagines the thoughts and 
emotions of another person.7 Empathetic 
responses may be activated in situations that 
actively elicit cognitive processes, as is the case 
with film consumption. The activity of watching 
a film provides suitable opportunities to broaden 
the individual mind, above all by imagining the 
thoughts, feelings and emotions of fictional 
characters. According to Murray Smith, such 
occasions resemble an extension of our mind, 
enabling us to “incorporate” parts of the minds 
of others8 – of course only imaginatively. 
 
To be involved in processes of empathy by 
enjoying representational art in general and film 
in particular, certain conditions are helpful. For 
example, it is of avail if the spectator is 
presented with fully developed characters and if 
he or she has a firm grasp of a solid, causally 
motivated narrative.9 Moreover, empathy can 
only be achieved successfully when the 
spectator, with the pool of information at hand 
as described above, feels the desire to go beyond 
the narrative provided, in order to imagine more 
than is given in the initial narrative frame. 
Furthermore, empathy can be supported by 
practical reasoning, when the spectator tries to 
predict the likely outcomes of the plot and the 
fates of the characters.10 
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Mark of the Devil adheres to this logic only 
partially. The film provides minimal narrative 
structures that, while recognisable to the viewer, 
nonetheless leave many gaps in the plot that the 
viewer must fill in order to generate coherent 
meaning. These gaps are especially striking in 
the portrayal of characters or in the 
chronological and causal unfolding of events. 
The timeline seems to be quite confusing: 
temporal orientation is difficult as the plot 
unfolds mostly in the interiors of the castle after 
the puppet players’ arrest. In the last third of the 
film – after the capture of the nobleman and his 
wife – events progress rapidly and the story is 
told in a series of snapshots. Furthermore, there 
are some missing links in the plot: nobody is 
charged explicitly for blinding the advocate, 
Albino’s death remains seemingly unnoticed etc. 
The spectator has no choice but to try and 
predict the next steps in the unfolding of events, 
to consider the thoughts and actions of 
characters or to imagine their feelings. 
(Moreover, the viewer’s mental construction of 
the story might be impeded by historical 
inaccuracies such as a modern-day traffic sign 
on a street of the early-modern village that is 
barely covered by baskets or the shadow of the 
camera operator visible during another street 
scene.) This particular kind of narrative structure 
results in an apparently clumsy and often 
pedestrian plot that operates with abrupt 
montage, ellipses and characters with 
insubstantial motivations. Of course, these 
characteristics do not support the process of 
imagining characters and experiencing stories 
empathically. However, there is an exception. 
One character certainly solicits an emphatic 
response from the spectator, the young 
witchfinder Christian, because of his 
disappointment in his superior and his protest 
against the witch-hunting mission (and finally 
his demise). Christian’s character drawing might 
not be the most refined in film history, but it 
certainly stands out from Mark of the Devil’s 
diegetic spectrum of rather undistinguished and 
stereotypical figures. 
 
For the viewer, the attempt to understand 
character motivation and create a chronological-
causal chain of events is a significant obstacle to 
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immersing in the story and may therefore 
prevent him or her from engaging imaginatively 
with Mark of the Devil’s complex narrative 
scenario. Actually, it can be difficult to 
empathise with the sketchily portrayed victims 
in the analysed film, even though the spectator is 
naturally emotionally affected by the extensive 
torture of the innocent. Due to its peculiar 
narrative structure, the movie only partially 
fulfils the conditions for conjuring feelings 
through empathic processes. 
 
Implications of Voyeuristic Looking 
Though Mark of the Devil does not stimulate 
empathic imagining in the way that more 
classically constructed films do, the movie offers 
many spectacular sensations to the viewer. By 
prioritising sensory and emotional experience 
over imaginative and empathic engagement with 
fictional characters, the film gives way to 
experiencing the here-and-now dimension of 
situations, thus allowing the spectator to relate to 
it in various different ways. For example, the 
torture scenes of Mark of the Devil can elicit 
highly subjective emotional reactions: one might 
be revolted by the plight of innocent victims, or 
experience sympathetic feelings towards the 
physical pain of the characters, or might even 
take pleasure in witnessing the torment of the 
victims. However, sympathetic responses and 
empathetic processes concerning fictional 
characters can be very different from one 
another: the latter are necessarily momentary 
and susceptible to interruption, even if the 
spectator feels strongly motivated to alleviate 
the difficulties of the character.11 This is plainly 
a result of the film’s prioritising  sensations over 
narrative coherence to the detriment of 
empathetic imagination. Therefore, in Mark of 
the Devil, the viewer observes characters as well 
as their actions mainly from a perspective that is 
external to the fictional world.12 Empathic 
involvement and a continuous sympathising 
with characters are thus usually blocked, and 
this promotes a peculiar mode of looking. The 
movie places the spectator in a position in which 
the simple act of looking at others (who cannot 
look back) becomes a spectacle and a source of 
pleasure. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that the film certainly supplies a 
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graded range of points of view and spectator 
positions, but overall, Mark of the Devil seems 
to elicit a distanced mode of spectatorship. The 
film enables to digress from this dominant mode 
only in scenes of spectacle which facilitate 
intense emotions. 
 
This kind of spectatorship is often related to a 
somewhat sensitive issue, namely voyeurism, 
which is fraught with moralistic associations in 
journalistic film criticism. But before discussing 
the moral aspects of voyeurism, it is worthwhile 
to define the term. Torben Grodal suggests a 
distinction between passive-cognitive 
observation and voyeurism, which cannot be 
regarded as being entirely passive, because it 
always entails at least some degree of emotional 
engagement. In the strict sense, voyeurism 
would imply, for example, the mere watching of 
sexual intercourse without the chance of acting 
out the desires elicited: “By blocking enaction in 
such films, the director cues powerful subjective 
experiences, just as he or she would in creating a 
horror scene in which there was no enactive 
outlet.”13 The word ‘enaction’ means that 
psychic and bodily processes are activated in 
response to fictional stimuli. Instead of a real 
and fully executed action, it can be understood 
as a preparation for action, even though the 
viewer cannot actually act in the fictional world. 
According to Grodal, the blockade of 
intervening in the diegesis evokes subjective 
images of bodily reactions in the spectator. 
However, voyeurism should not be confused 
with our strong interest in looking at the human 
body or at intersubjective acts in the interest of 
understanding other people’s behaviour. 
Voyeurism is connected with the natural human 
curiosity14 for the uncommon, hidden, bizarre or 
forbidden, which is not pathological but which 
nonetheless may conflict, to varying degrees, 
with moral norms. 
 
We are familiar with the widespread concerns 
over voyeurism, especially in regard to filmic 
representations of violence. Moral campaigns 
condemning voyeurism claim that watching, for 
example, torture scenes may cause macabre 
pleasure in certain viewers, which is linked to 
the development or unleashing of perverse 
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desires.15 According to these claims, voyeurism 
is dangerous to the extent that it desensitises 
viewers16 and immoral to the extent that it makes 
the spectator rejoice in the suffering of others. 
 
Often, voyeurism is associated with immorality, 
a connotation we cannot confirm. By contrast, 
we suggest that witnessing intense or prolonged 
sequences of graphic on-screen suffering 
inevitably invokes moral qualms and is felt by 
most viewers to be morally offensive. In this 
respect, Michele Aaron points out that film 
spectatorship is inherently related to the human 
alignment with the suffering of others, because 
“we are always implicated in, not only as 
consumers but as consensual parties in the 
generation of characters’ suffering for our 
entertainment.”17 Aaron argues that film 
spectatorship is always ethically charged, as it 
represents a negotiation of subjective pleasures 
and the imagined interests of others. 
Furthermore, the spectator’s prolonged 
contemplation of the suffering of a character can 
be an occasion to reflect on moral issues and to 
consider actual personal experiences related to 
the events witnessed. Watching graphic torture 
can thus be seen as an opportunity to think about 
the notion of suffering as well as the issues of 
responsibility and justice. Voyeurism, in this 
sense, is far more than simply fascination with 
spectacular images of the tortured body. It 
provides the opportunity to ponder the 
filmmakers’ motives for performing torture as 
well as the audience’s interest in watching 
violent movies. It is important to acknowledge 
that films that present disturbing images and 
sounds of suffering invite considerations of the 
relationship between the responsibility of 
spectatorship and the desire of viewing. To this 
effect, we too would like to insist that there is 
nothing intrinsically pernicious or problematic 
about voyeurism or any mediated witnessing of 
suffering.18 
 
Instead, voyeurism reinforces self-reflexivity 
with regard to spectatorship by encouraging the 
contemplation of one’s viewing practice. By 
providing disconcerting audiovisual cues, Mark 
of the Devil allows a wide range of meta-
representational reflections, evoking the 
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spectator’s responsibility for and individual 
pleasure in watching violent content. Here, it is 
important to recall images of audience members 
at the horrific executions and the facial 
expressions of witnesses of the tortures in Mark 
of the Devil. The film puts great emphasis on 
displaying the horror and, possibly, pleasure of 
the bystanders, as exemplified by a series of 
reaction shots, close-ups of facial expressions 
and other angles on the audiences at the witch 
trials and executions. The behaviour and 
reactions of the public can be considered as an 
expression of and a reference to the emotional 
and cognitive states of the film spectator, as well 
as to the tension between voyeuristic desires 
aroused by the suffering of others, moral 
indignation and, above all, rebellion against 
terrible injustice. The revolt and revenge 
sequences, which represent the response of the 
villagers at the end of the film, may not only be 
grasped as violent acts of justice, but also as a 
visual metaphor for the impulse to act when 
confronted with violence. The spectator is 
willing to break with his or her passive 
perceptions and feels the urge to spring into 
action in order to regain moral autonomy. This 
desire is satisfied by the peasants’ punishment of 
the authorities for their wrongdoing. 
 
The Moral Dilemma 
In depicting gruesome scenes of torture and 
mayhem, Mark of the Devil strings together 
instances of outrageous injustice that are 
committed under the pretext of enforcing God’s 
will. The narrative demands a moral resolution; 
the perceptual or sensational dimension of such 
spectacles, on the other hand, is linked to 
seemingly immoral voyeurism or even sadistic 
desires. However, the spectator usually does not 
acknowledge this dynamic. Instead, the viewer 
ostensibly desires a narrative closure that chimes 
with conventional moral rules: wicked people 
are punished and evil forces are defeated. In this 
sense, the story suggests at first glance the moral 
triumph of the victims, whose dignity not even 
torture can break, over the evil and monstrous 
witch hunters. The typical witch hunter 
characters (from whom, of course, Christian 
needs to be regarded separately) are paranoid, 
confused and broken despite their nominal 
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authority. The story focuses on the excessive 
investigations of the witch hunters, who, in the 
course of the plot, increasingly lose control and 
compromise their profession by giving in to their 
greedy, selfish desires and sexual drives. As a 
result, they fall victim to their own obsessions: 
they are threatened, hunted and banished by the 
villagers they have terrorised. In short, the 
hunter becomes the prey. 
 
However, the film provides more than just moral 
pleasures. The spectator can also relish the 
supposedly immoral depictions of sexual 
violence and torture. This tension is enacted in a 
sequence that functions as mise en abyme: the 
puppet play about the proud man, which satirises 
the hypocrisy of the persecution of alleged 
witches, highlights the divergent spectatorial 
delights (moral resolution vs. voyeuristic 
enjoyment) on offer in Mark of the Devil. On 
one hand, the play reflects the motivations of the 
main diegetic characters as well as the ideas of 
the filmmakers, and, on the other hand, it is a 
metaleptic performance, where boundaries 
between distinct levels of narration (the puppet 
play about the proud man/the story of the witch 
hunters/the film about witch hunting) are 
transgressed. 
 
In what seems to be a luxurious living room, 
nobleman Walter and his wife, hidden behind a 
stage, perform a play with puppets on strings in 
front of an audience of elegantly dressed 
children and adults. When the advocate, the 
executioner Jeff Wilkens and two of their 
henchmen burst in the room, they pause in 
surprise and watch the show. In this very 
moment, the puppeteers, who also perform their 
characters’ voices, start mocking the witch 
persecution craze without being aware of the 
intruders’ presence: 
 
Puppet 1: I am a great wizard, and if I had 
feathers, I could fly.  
Puppet 2: Only angels and witches can fly. 
Puppet 1: Then I’ll be an angel. 
Puppet 2:  You are not good enough to be one. 
At the most you could ride on a broomstick like 
an old witch. 
Puppet 1: Like an old witch? But I want to be an 
angel. 
Puppet 2: No, no, you’re not good enough. 
Puppet 1: All right, then I’ll be a witch. 
Puppet 2:  That’s impossible; you are not bad 
enough for that. […] 
Jeff Wilkens: Those puppets not only talk, but 
can answer correctly questions they’re asked.  
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Advocate: And they appear one minute and then 
they disappear the next, and then they walk on 
air and have facial expressions just like human 
beings. I tell you, it’s magic. 
 
 
After the players emerge from behind the stage 
and explain their show, the advocate orders his 
henchmen to arrest the puppeteers on the 
suspicion of witchcraft. A commotion ensues in 
which he stabs Walter with a needle to find the 
devil’s mark. However, the latter’s wife defends 
her husband and pulls the advocate to the floor. 
While struggling with the him, she blinds her 
opponent with the needle. 
 
The puppet play represents a metafiction, which 
supplies a clear moral explanation of the story: a 
proud man (the witch hunter) fools himself into 
believing that he is an angel (or doing God’s 
work), but he has to come to the realisation that 
he is not good enough and thus cannot fly 
(because he is not really a servant of God). This 
metaphor presents the witch hunter as a 
hypocritical character who pretends to chase evil 
away, creates the illusion of saving souls and 
destroys bodies possessed by evil. The dialogue 
between the two puppets about his not being 
good enough to be an angel or bad enough to be 
a witch can be read as the internal struggle of the 
witch hunter in defining his own purpose and 
agenda. His ambitions to fly (to be the one in 
power, dominating others around him, especially 
women) are so out of reach that even though he 
wants to be an angel, he settles for being a witch 
(being evil) in order to achieve this goal. Thus, 
the witch hunter is completely aware of the rift 
between the agenda he is advocating (cleansing 
the land of evil forces) and the one he is 
pursuing (achieving a powerful position by any 
means necessary), and accepts this evil role. 
Whereas the puppet show clearly functions as a 
condensed representation of the ethical 
dynamics at play in the whole film, we would 
argue that its meaning goes beyond this moral 
allegory. 
 
In our reading, the puppet show staged by actor 
Adrian Hoven, who, as the co-director and 
executive producer, played an important role in 
the making of this film, conveys another 
important message. The appearance of the co-
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director in his own film indicates the self-
reflexive dimension of the scene under 
discussion. The puppet play is presented as a 
creative and entertaining performance, i.e. a 
work of art. Only the advocate and his slow and 
simple-minded colleagues are unaware of its 
aesthetic capacities, as they cannot appreciate 
aesthetic pleasures because of their fear of evil 
powers and the urge to punish it. (It remains 
unresolved whether the henchmen actually 
believe in their own accusation or if they use the 
show, aware of its harmlessness, as a convenient 
excuse to do damage.) The ensuing blindness of 
the advocate, who indeed loses his sight in this 
sequence, can be seen as a metaphor for the 
strong aversion to artworks and voyeuristic 
practices, which are rejected on account of 
groundless moral prejudices. 
 
Therefore, the puppet show can be read in at 
least two ways: on the one hand, it can be seen 
as a moral allegory of the narrative, as a moral 
treatise on Lord Cumberland’s failure. Observed 
from this angle, it is a metafiction that illustrates 
the moral conflict at the heart of the entire film. 
On the other hand, the performance constitutes a 
meta-representation of the film-as-artefact and a 
reflection on horrific but desired images. The 
parodic puppet play falls victim to the dominant 
ideology, the witch hunt. In general, this 
intermezzo reflects conservative societies’ 
distaste for every kind of representation, which 
is denounced as black magic, and their deep-
seated fear of taboo content – in this case, 
witchcraft. The puppet-show sequence criticises 
the conservative stance towards works of art that 
are opposed because of ill-founded and clichéd 
anxieties.  
 
To sum up, the disruption of the puppet show 
and the punishment of the puppeteers deliver an 
allegorical message: the horrific spectacle, 
which is ostensibly condemned by the spectator 
as immoral and disgusting, is celebrated at the 
meta-level of representation. A moral revolt 
against it is undermined by the aesthetic 
fascination for the creative artwork. 
Spectatorship is marked by this ambiguity, 
which can be observed across the levels of film-
as-fiction and film-as-artefact. 
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This ambiguity on the part of the beholder 
corresponds with the tragic fate of Christian. He 
is the only character who allows insight in his 
inner life, emotions and moral doubts, and 
therefore the only figure who involves the 
spectator in empathic imagination in a film that 
otherwise elicits a distanced mode of 
spectatorship. Lord Cumberland’s assistant is a 
tragic hero because he misjudges his master and 
places absolute trust in justice legitimated by the 
sovereign. Because he is blinded by this trust, 
injustice goes unnoticed by Christian, so he 
commits what Aristotle describes as hamartia, a 
tragic error. As a representative of the 
authorities, he is sacrificed by the enraged crowd 
and lynched just outside the castle. Christian is 
too late in realising his mistake, and even though 
he does not deserve a punishment of such 
cruelty, he puts up with his fate without any 
resistance. The story of the young witch hunter 
is indeed a classic tragic plot and the character’s 
brutal fate, which is foreshadowed throughout 
the film, provides suspense, but does not supply 
any pleasure. 
 
Initially, Christian has a limited but authentic 
motivation: he wants to prosecute witches and 
acts according to a sovereign moral law. But 
later, he overcomes his own blindness (based on 
decency, morality and the fear of evil) in favour 
of the broader perspective of a sceptical 
spectator. Therefore, we argue that Mark of the 
Devil puts forward a significant critique of 
punishing people and works of art while using 
moralistic rhetoric as legitimation. Obviously, 
the film does not offer any common moral 
resolution of the story, where evil receives its 
just deserts and good is rescued and rewarded. 
The failure to deliver poetic justice is a strong 
negative stimulus, because appropriate come-
uppance plays an important role in the 
enjoyment of fiction. William Flesch argues that 
the most important motive for creating and 
enjoying narratives goes back to our strong 
desire to penalise people for their selfishness, 
cheating, deceit and sins.19 Flesch makes the 
case that our sensibility towards moral 
wrongdoings has evolutionary roots and is based 
in the psychology of co-operation, meaning that 
we try to unmask treacherous, overly 
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competitive and selfish behaviour for the sake of 
the group.20 For contemporary audiences, the co-
operative goals have already faded, but the 
underlying mechanisms are very much alive: we 
have the urge to chastise not only real people, 
but also fictional characters for their selfish 
behaviour. This film, however, really lets the 
spectator down in this sense, because while it 
supplies a story with outrageously unjust crimes, 
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9 (2), 11–40: 11. 
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